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In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the tra-
ditional approach to semantics. Devitt’s main line of argument is an 
inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragma-
tists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics 
are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form 
of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the 
broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, 
we discuss three aspects of a draft of Devitt’s Overlooking Conventions, 
which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. 
First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach’s distinction between con-
vention and standardization overlooks important features of standard-
ization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt’s argument against linguistic 
pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a 
similar argument can be mounted against semantic minimalism. While 
Devitt and minimalists have a common enemy, they are not allies either. 
Third, we address a methodological diffi culty in Devitt’s view concern-
ing a threat of over-generation and propose a solution to it. Although 
this paper is the result of collaboration the authors have written differ-
ent parts. Carlo Penco has written part 1, Massimiliano Vignolo has 
written part 2 and part 3.
Keywords: Convention, incompleteness, minimalism, normativity, 
semantics, standardization.
1. Conventions and the problem of standardization
One of Devitt’s main claims against linguistic pragmatism (or contex-
tualism) is that many examples intended as cases of meaning under-
determination fall under a more general mechanism of meaning forma-
tion that Devitt calls ‘metaconventions’ governing polysemy. However, 
polysemy is a battlefi eld among different approaches: cognitive ap-
proaches, psycholinguistic approaches, synchronic and diachronic ap-
proaches and computational approaches, with no real consensus on the 
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status of polysemy itself (see for instance Ravin et al. 2000, Nerlich et 
al. 2003, Vanhove 2008, Falkum, Vicente 2015).
For instance, there is no agreement on whether to treat a linguistic 
phenomenon as polysemy or semantic generality. The Russian verbs 
plavat’ and plyt’ are both used do designate multidirectional or mono-
directional motion in water. In English we have three verbs for motion 
in water representing passive motion (‘fl oat’), self-propelling motion of 
animated individuals (‘swim’) and motion of vessels and people aboard 
(‘seal’). We may claim (a) plyt’ actually distinguishes the three different 
meanings depending on context, and we may distinguish three differ-
ent lexical units (or conceptual units), or we may claim that (b) plyt’ is 
semantically general and does not distinguish among fl oat, swim and 
sail (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2008: 8–9).
There are various tests for distinguishing semantic generality and 
polysemy, but this distinction is really ‘a tricky business’ because it 
often depends on the question under discussion in a specifi c theoretical 
settings (see Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2008: 10–13). We accept here some 
common results in the recent discussion on polysemy and will not enter 
the debate of polysemy vs. semantic generality. Neither we will follow 
Grundzinska 2011, who claims, contrary to Devitt’s view, that consid-
ering polysemy a semantic phenomenon and not a pragmatic one leads 
to blurring the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and to 
meaning eliminativism.
We claim that Devitt’s insistence on the role of metaconventions for 
grounding polysemy does not lead to such an undesirable consequence 
if a more restricted view of conventional meaning is adopted, avoiding 
a too generalized use of polysemy. Our discussion points to a distinc-
tion between what we may call ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ metaconvention. 
Such distinction might be helpful to cope with the alleged shortcomings 
of Devitt’s liberal use of polysemy.
In Overlooking Conventions,1 Devitt employs the notion of metacon-
vention to address the problems raised by Nunberg (1979: 149–150), 
who suggests solving some ambiguities of meaning with a pragmatic 
account of deferred reference and ‘explain polysemy without having to 
introduce any linguistic conventions.’ Nunberg was intoducing one of 
the most debated examples in the literature on meaning underdeter-
mination:
(0) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.
Given that sandwiches are inanimate things, they are not agents of 
actions. The predication ‘is sitting’ constrains a shift of the meaning 
of ‘ham sandwich’ into something that accepts the predicate ‘sitting’. 
In this case the person who ordered the ham sandwich. Nunberg in-
troduces here a pragmatic mechanism, analogous to a metonymical 
1 Given that we refer here to the incomplete draft, dated 7/9/2018, our critical 
remarks are not strictly directed to the forthcoming book, which might have a 
different take on the problem discussed here.
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transfer from a part to the whole. With the idea of metaconventions 
Devitt suggests that we have general rules for defi ning different types 
of conventional meaning with the same lexical entry. They are typically 
presented in the following form:
if a word refers to things of type X will also refer to things of type Y
Examples are:
 A count noun for an organism yields a mass noun for its skin 
(rabbit, crocodile…)
 A word for a physical entity yields a word for its content (book, 
television…)
 A word for a location yields a word for its legal entity or its people 
(state, city…) 
In linguistic literature these kinds of expressions are defi ned as ‘dot-
objects’ or ‘dual kinds terms’. They are expressions that can refer to 
different types: for instance, ‘book’ or ‘television’ may refer to a physical 
or an information entity, ‘house’ or ‘room’ may refer to the building or to 
the location; ‘meal’ or ‘breakfast’ may refer to an event or to food. What 
constrains the choice of the relevant type is the predicative phrase, 
with a mechanism called ‘dot exploitation’. Dot-exploitation is a light 
form of coercion2 that consists in exploiting one aspect of the dot-type 
expression, by predicating only that aspect. In ‘The meal was heavy’, 
the predicate ‘heavy’ constrains the type ‘food eaten’, while in ‘the meal 
lasted one hour’ the predicate ‘lasted’ constrains the type ‘event’.
This particular way to constrain the choice of the type also helps 
distinguishing regular or logical polysemy from irregular or acciden-
tal or idiosyncratic polysemy.3 Regular or logical polysemy relies on 
lexical rules, while accidental polysemy is a kind of lexical ambiguity 
that depends on context. Two basic criteria for distinguishing logical or 
proper polysemy from accidental polysemy are the Test of Anaphoric 
Cotenability and the Co-predication Test.4 The anaphora test is easily 
exemplifi ed:
(1) That book is boring. Put it on the shelf.
Here apparently the anaphora refers to a book as physical object, while 
the fi rst occurrence of ‘book’ refers to an informational object.
2 See Pustejowsky-Jezek (2008); Asher (2011). On coercion see also Asher (2015).
3 The distinction is not always clear. Apresjan (1974), after distinguishing 
regular and irregular polysemy, considers the example of the ham sandwich as a 
case of regular polysemy, something that has been put in doubt later (see Asher 
2011, 2015).
4 Copredication is a topic of interest since Montague 1975 and has raised many 
problems and tentative solutions in logic and linguistics (see. e.g. Barhamian et 
al. 2017). Here we are only interested in using it to challenge the idea of too an 
easy generalization of proper polysemy. We do not discuss tests for distinguishing 
polysemy from generality or indeterminacy, a topic on which Devitt just raised some 
doubts and did not elaborate in the draft discussed here.
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The copredication test is given as follows: we are in front of a proper 
polysemy when, in the same sentence, we can attribute to an expres-
sion different predicates, concerning different types of things the ex-
pression stands for.
Examples are:
(2) Mary picked up and mastered three books on mathematics. 
[the two predications refer to a physical object and to its content]
(3) The city mainly voted democrat and passed a progressive law
[the two predications refer to population and legal entity]
The copredication test helps understanding the way in which we dis-
ambiguate, following the mechanism of dot-exploitation mentioned 
above. The choice of the type depends on the lexicon used for the predi-
cation because the kinds of predications constrain the type. In example 
(2), the predicate ‘pick up’, a verb for physical activities, constrains 
the expression ‘book’ to be intended as a physical object. The predicate 
‘mastered’, a verb for capacities and abilities, constrains the expression 
‘book’ to be intended as an informational object. The choice of meaning 
therefore depends on the relations among types in the lexicon, which 
can be viewed as an expression of ontological relations embedded in 
the lexicon. ‘Dual kind terms’ are a perfect exemplifi cation of Devitt’s 
examples.
The above criteria for ‘proper’ polysemy put some worries on a gener-
alized use of polysemy to widen the number of conventional meanings. 
Devitt presents his answer to Nunberg’s example as a consequence of a 
general metaconvention prompting the following conventional reading: 
(4) A word for ordered food yields (in restaurants at least) a word for 
who ordered it.5
Here we face a problem. Actually, it seems that ‘ham sandwich’ is not 
a typical case of polysemy. There are at least two reasons: as Asher 
remarks, sentences (0) and (5) seem to stand at different levels: a sen-
tence like (0) is more diffi cult to process than a sentence like (5):
(0) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.
(5) I’m parked out back.
There is a standard metaconvention according to which the word refer-
ring to a private vehicle of transportation is often referred to with the 
word for the owner. I may say: ‘my car is parked out back’, but nobody 
would have any diffi culty to understand my using (5) as referring to 
my car (Asher 2011: 250–251). Sentence (0) seems missing this easy 
interpretation. Second, and even more important, (0) presents some 
problems about copredication, making some sentences awkward or con-
tradictory:
5 As in Devitt (draft: 143).
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(6) The ham sandwich went away and then he came back and paid 
for it#.6
(7) The ham sandwich left without paying and I have eaten it#.
(8) The ham sandwich that hasn’t been eaten is on the counter#.7
These problems make the example (0) diffi cult to be solved in a seman-
tic framework. Even Stanley (2005b: 225), one of the strongest antago-
nist of contextualists, recognized that problems coming from examples 
like (0) are genuinely worrying for a semanticist: on the one hand, we 
recognize that the intuitive truth conditions involve a person rather 
that a sandwich. But Stanley continues: ‘Yet it’s not clear that a pro-
cess that maps ham sandwiches onto persons counts as genuinely se-
mantic.’ However, also Recanati’s contextualist solution is not without 
problems. If we take (8) we might interpret it with the reading that the 
eater of the ham sandwich that hasn’t been eaten is on the counter; but 
why couldn’t we interpret it with the reading on which the ham sand-
wich itself has been put back on the counter? With a general defi nition 
of transfer, Asher (2011: 69) claims, ‘there are no constraints on when 
a sense transfer function can be introduced at all (…). Why should we 
make the transfer in some cases and in other we couldn’t?’ Transfer 
function simply runs the risk of overgeneration of meanings.8
Devitt implicitly gives a suggestion for an answer. Metaconventions 
have typically this form:
 “A word for a physical entity yields a word for its [informational] 
content”,
Differently from the general form of metaconventions, example (0) 
seems to require a specifi cation:
(4) A word for ordered food yields (in restaurants at least) a word for 
who ordered it.
Our italics makes it apparent that there is some contextual restriction 
that does not appear in more general metaconventions linked to dual 
kinds terms expressing polysemy and able to pass the copredication test.
Nunberg’s example—example (0)—reminds us that we have an 
analogous problem with numbers. Certainly there is a general conven-
6 Suggestion by Belen Soria.
7 The Example is given in Asher (2011: 65). For a more detailed discussion of 
similar examples see Asher (2015: 68, 77).
8 Somebody might use the idea of metonymy. However, cases of this kind are 
not exactly cases of metonymy because they do not represent a part for a whole, or, 
better, the part for the whole is highly theoretically construed and strongly context 
dependent: the food for the eater, the chair for the person who should be sitting on 
the chair, the number for the person somehow linked with the number in a certain 
situation. Recanati (2010: 167) acknowledges the problem of the dual interpretation: 
‘‘The ham sandwich stinks’ can be so understood, in a suitable context, even though 
the property of stinking potentially applies to sandwiches as well as to customers’. In 
this way transfer is not a linguistically controlled process, but it is mere pragmatics, 
depending freely on intentions and context.
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tion to use numbers to refer to everything, and in particular to tables 
where waiters serve customers, or to customers themselves:
(9) (Customer at table) number 7 left without paying.
However, also numbers seem not to pass copredication tests:
(9) Number 7 went away and then he came back and paid for it#.
(10) Number 7 went away and left itself completely empty#.
There is an obvious convention to use numbers to refer to people in 
restaurants. The convention is fairly general and works in many other 
contexts, as, for example, in chess competitions (‘Number 7 ended the 
game’), at the post offi ce (‘Number 23 go to the cashier’), at the Hospi-
tal (‘Please pay attention to number 25’). However, there is no general 
convention for which kind of object a number represents: a customer, 
a chess player, a patient, a bed, a table or what else. The convention is 
restricted, every time, by a specifi c setting and by previous agreement 
on the use of one part of lexicon. In case of restaurant, numbers and 
food may be used to refer to the person sitting at a table or ordering 
food. But we need a specifi c context and a specifi c agreement among 
waiters at the restaurant. It cannot be generalised.
Let us make a further example: the expression ‘chair’ is used at 
conferences to refer to the chairperson. It seems, again, that there are 
problems with copredication. We doubt that we can properly accept:
(11) The chair (referring to the chairperson) is not here yet and it 
(referring to the piece of furniture) is empty#.
Our suggestion is that we are in front of kinds of conventions that, 
being restricted to specifi c cognitive contexts, should be distinguished 
from the standard production of ‘conventional meanings’ via polysemy. 
We might call them ‘restricted’ or ‘weak’ conventions.
To sum up, these kinds of cases (i) don’t appear to be subject to 
copredication and therefore they cannot be counted as ‘dual kinds 
terms’ like ‘city’, ‘book’, ‘lunch’ etc. and (ii) are more ‘localised’ or linked 
to specifi c cognitive contexts. Saying that they are ‘localized’ we mean 
that they require also a very specialised ‘mutual understanding’ in lo-
cal environment (waiters in the restaurant, participants to a confer-
ence, and so on). All these cases are not easily treated inside Devitt’s 
framework of metaconventions explaining disambiguation of conven-
tional meanings. Furthermore, they seem to be a good approximation 
of what Bach meant by ‘standardization’, which is connected with some 
kind of weaker metaconventions insofar as it requires ‘online’ inferen-
tial processes (restricted to local or specialised cognitive contexts).
The two main ideas supporting standardization are (i) mutual be-
liefs and (ii) streamlining or default inferences. It is true that Bach’s 
standardization is something not clearly defi ned and with no sharp 
and neat difference from convention. However, there is an interesting 
aspect of Bach’s defi nition of conventionalization as based on ‘general 
mutual belief’, while standardization does not entail such thing (Bach 
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1995: 683). The implicit suggestion, I suggest, is that linguistic con-
ventions based on general mutual beliefs should be contrasted with 
conventions based on some particular mutual beliefs: a convergence of 
beliefs grounded on some particular contextual or cognitive settings. 
We may say that there is no general linguistic convention for treating 
‘ham sandwich’, ‘number 7’, ‘bed 25’, and ‘the chair’ for a specifi c kind of 
object, but only a general strategy of online adjustments to recover dif-
ferent kinds of objects depending on the specifi c or particular contexts. 
A useful distinction might be the following: some basic linguistic 
(meta) conventions are disambiguated by linguistic context via type 
selection constrained by the lexicon. These are typical cases of conven-
tional meanings. Other more specialized cases are disambiguated by 
specifi c cognitive contexts and require more ‘streamlining’ inferential 
processes. Are these cases of standardization? We are content to point 
out some interesting aspects of Bach’s idea of standardization. Not ev-
ery disambiguation comes from metaconventions, as Devitt (draft: 143) 
recognises:
‘Metaphors, Metonymy, synecdoche, yield other examples of polysemous 
phenomena which often become conventionalized, yielding ambiguities. 
These processes leading to new meanings are to some extent “rule-gov-
erned, and predictable”, although not to the extent of those covered by meta-
conventions’.
Therefore, Devitt himself acknowledges that there are different kinds 
of conventions, some generate conventional meanings from polysemy 
and some are less generalized. We tried to show the diffi culty of a too 
hasty generalization of the idea of meta-conventions supporting differ-
ent conventional meanings given by polysemy. Shall we be obliged to 
accept underdetermination of meaning? Sometimes, probably, yes.
2. The normativity of meaning and minimalism
Devitt’s main line of argument against linguistic pragmatism is based 
on an inference to the best explanation. Semantics in the traditional 
approach and linguistic pragmatism agree that their principal theo-
retical goal is to explain the literal truth conditional content of utter-
ances of sentences. Linguistic pragmatism disagrees with traditional 
semantics on the idea that all context sensitivity is morpho-lexico-syn-
tactically triggered, either in the form of a plurality of related conven-
tional meanings (polysemy) or in the form of conventions of saturation 
(indexicality in Devitt’s broad sense of linguistically governed context 
sensitivity). According to linguistic pragmatists, semantic conventions 
provide at most propositional schemata (propositional radicals) that 
lack determinate truth conditions. Even in cases in which a sentence 
possesses determinate truth conditions by semantic conventions alone, 
there is very often a mismatch between the truth conditions so deter-
mined and the truth conditions of the utterances of the sentence. The 
conclusion drawn by linguistic pragmatists is that the truth conditions 
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of utterances are underdetermined by their narrow and broad semantic 
properties and a new theoretical approach introducing truth condition-
al roles for pragmatic properties is called for.
According to Devitt, the explanation of truth conditions supplied by 
semantics on the traditional approach is superior to the explanation 
supplied by linguistic pragmatism because the former accounts for the 
normative aspect of meaning while the latter does not. Normativity 
is constitutive of the notion of meaning. If there are meanings, there 
must be such things as going right and going wrong with the use of 
language. The use of an expression is right if it conforms with its mean-
ing, and wrong otherwise. If literal contents of utterances are thought 
of in truth conditional terms, conformity with meaning amounts to 
constraints on truth conditions. In case of polysemous expressions the 
speaker undertakes the semantic burden of selecting a convention that 
fi xes a determinate contribution to the truth conditional contents ex-
pressed by utterances of sentences. In case of expressions governed by 
conventions of saturation, the speaker undertakes the semantic bur-
den of loading the demanded parameters with contextual values.
Devitt says that the problem for linguistic pragmatism is to provide 
an account of how the conventional meanings of expressions constrain 
truth conditional contents of utterances, if the composition of truth 
conditions is not governed by linguistic conventions, and how, lacking 
such an explanation, linguistic pragmatism can preserve the distinc-
tion between going right and going wrong with the use of language. In 
the following we will elaborate on Devitt’s argument against linguistic 
pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that 
semantic minimalism suffers from a similar diffi culty. It is diffi cult for 
minimalists to explain the normative aspect of meaning.
Semantics on the traditional approach, which Devitt defends, and 
linguistic pragmatism agree on the view that the goal of semantics is to 
explain the literal contents of utterances of sentences. They both agree 
that there must be a close explanatory relation between the meaning 
encoded in a sentence S and the semantic contents of utterances of S. 
One corollary of this conception is that if a sentence S is systematically 
uttered for expressing different contents at different contexts, some ex-
pression occurring in S must be context sensitive. As said, the point of 
disagreement is that semantics on the traditional approach explains 
context sensitivity by pluralities of conventions and by conventions of 
saturation, whereas linguistic pragmatism explains it in terms of mod-
ulation (optional pragmatic processes).
The debate between Devitt and linguistic pragmatists takes for 
granted from the start the explanatory connection between meanings 
and contents of speech acts. Semantic minimalists (Borg 2004, 2012, 
Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Soames 2002) instead reject such explana-
tory connection. On their view, semantics is not in the business of ex-
plaining the contents of speech acts performed by utterances of sen-
tences. Minimalists work with a notion of semantic content that does 
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not play the role of (direct) speech act content. According to minimalists 
the semantic content of a sentence is a full truth conditional content 
that is obtained compositionally by the syntactic structure of the sen-
tence and the semantic values of the expressions in the sentence that 
are fi xed by conventional meaning. Moreover, minimalists say that the 
set (the Basic Set) of genuinely context sensitive expressions, which are 
governed by conventions of saturation, comprises only overt indexicals, 
demonstrative, tense markers and a few other words. Minimalists call 
the semantic content of a sentence its minimal proposition.
The above statement that minimal propositions are not contents of 
speech acts requires qualifi cation. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) argue 
indeed for Speech Act Pluralism. They argue that speech acts have a 
plurality of contents and the minimal proposition of a sentence is al-
ways one the many contents that its utterances express. In order to 
protect Speech Act Pluralism from the objection that very often speak-
ers are not aware of having made an assertion with the minimal propo-
sition as content, and, if speakers were asked, they would deny to have 
asserted the minimal proposition, Cappelen and Lepore argue that 
speakers can sincerely assert a proposition without believing it and 
without being aware of having asserted it.
Semantic minimalists oppose linguistic pragmatism and argue that 
their examples confl ate minimal propositions with speech act contents. 
Although Devitt and semantic minimalists have a common enemy, 
they are not allies because they disagree on the theoretical goals of 
semantics and, consequently, their respective notions of semantic con-
tent diverge. In the remainder of this section we will argue that seman-
tic minimalism suffers from a diffi culty about the normative aspect of 
meaning no less than linguistic pragmatism does.
The diffi culty for semantic minimalism is brought to light by incom-
pleteness arguments. An incompleteness argument shows that there is 
no invariant proposition that a sentence S expresses in all contexts of 
utterance. For example, with respect to the sentence ‘Mary is ready’ an 
incompleteness argument starts from the observation that if the sen-
tence is taken separately from contextual information specifying what 
Mary is ready for, people are unable to evaluate it as true or false. 
This evidence leads to the conclusion that there is no proposition—that 
Mary is ready (simpliciter)—that is invariant and is semantically ex-
pressed by ‘Mary is ready’ in all contexts of utterance.
Minimalists have responded to incompleteness arguments in two 
ways. Cappelen and Lepore (2005) accept the premises of incomplete-
ness arguments, i.e. that people are unable to truth evaluate certain 
sentences, but argue that from these premises it does not follow that 
minimal propositions do not exist. Borg (2012) adopts a different strat-
egy. Borg tries to block incompleteness arguments by rejecting their 
premises and explaining away people’s inability to truth evaluate the 
sentences in question. We will argue that both manoeuvres fail.
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Cappelen and Lepore (2005) raise the objection that incomplete-
ness arguments try to establish metaphysical conclusions, for example 
about the existence of the property of being ready (simpliciter) as a 
building block of the minimal proposition that Mary is ready, from 
premises that concern psychological facts regarding people’s ability to 
evaluate sentences as true or false. They rightly point out that psycho-
logical data are not relevant in metaphysical matters. Cappelen and 
Lepore say that people’s inability to evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is 
ready’ as true or false independently of contextual information does 
not provide evidence against the claim that the property of being ready 
exists and is the semantic content of the adjective ‘ready’. On the one 
hand, they acknowledge the problem of giving the analysis of the prop-
erty of being ready as a very diffi cult one, but only for metaphysicians, 
not for philosophers of language or semanticists. On the other hand, 
they (2005: 164) argue that semanticists have no diffi culty at all in 
stating what invariant minimal proposition is semantically encoded in 
‘Mary is ready’. The sentence ‘Mary is ready’ semantically expresses 
the minimal proposition that Mary is ready. There is no diffi culty in 
determining its truth-conditions either: ‘Mary is ready’ is true if and 
only if Mary is ready.
Cappelen and Lepore address the immediate objection that if the 
truth conditions of ‘Mary is ready’ is represented by a disquotation-
al principle like the one reported above, then nobody is able to verify 
whether such truth conditions are satisfi ed or not. If the premises of 
incompleteness arguments are taken at face value, as Cappelen and 
Lepore do, this fact is witnessed by people’s inability to evaluate ‘Mary 
is ready’ as true or false independently of information specifying what 
Mary is ready for. Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 164–165) respond that 
it is not a task for semantics to ascertain how things are in the world. 
For example, it is not a task for semantics to say whether ‘Mary is 
ready’ is true or false. That a semantic theory for a language L does not 
provide L-speakers with a method of verifi cation for L-sentences is not 
a defect of that semantic theory. Cappelen and Lepore say that those 
theorists who think otherwise indulge in verifi cationism.
Cappelen and Lepore’s confi dence in disquotational truth-conditions 
betrays their underestimation of the real nature of incompleteness ar-
guments. Contrary to what they claim, the conclusion of an incomplete-
ness argument is not a metaphysical conclusion about the existence of 
this or that entity. Rather, incompleteness arguments provide evidence 
against the possibility that certain entities get associated with certain 
expressions as their semantic contents. The conclusion of the incom-
pleteness argument about the adjective ‘ready’ is not that the property of 
being ready does not exist because people are unable to evaluate ‘Mary 
is ready’ without considering contextual information. The real conclu-
sion of the incompleteness argument is that a semantic theory that as-
signs the property of being ready to the adjective ‘ready’ as its semantic 
content is in tension with the normative aspect of meaning. The reason 
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why there is no minimal proposition that Mary is ready is not that there 
is no property of being ready. This is a metaphysical claim that does not 
follow from people’s inability to truth evaluate ‘Mary is ready’ without 
taking into account what Mary is ready for. The reason why ‘Mary is 
ready’ does not express the minimal proposition that Mary is ready is 
that the property of being ready cannot be the semantic content of the 
adjective ‘ready’, even if one grants that it is a real property. In general, 
and contrary to Cappelen and Lepore’s interpretation, the gist of in-
completeness arguments is not that certain entities do not exist, and a 
fortiori, the minimal propositions having those entities as constituents 
cannot exist. Rather, the gist of incompleteness arguments is that such 
entities, if any, cannot be the semantic contents of words, because a 
semantic theory that assigns such entities to words as their semantic 
contents is incompatible with the normative aspect of meaning, that is 
with the idea that speaking a language entails being under the norma-
tive control of semantic rules. We shall elaborate on this point.
Let us examine the following example in order to better understand 
the strength of this objection against Cappelen and Lepore. Suppose 
that a semantic theory for English contains a disquotational clause like 
(A) below, which arguably captures the idea that Cappelen and Lepore 
have in mind when they say that the semantic content of the adjective 
‘ready’ is the property of being ready (simpliciter):
(A) For any object o ‘ready’ applies to o if and only if o is ready.
Insofar as (A) is a semantic clause, it has a normative import. It estab-
lishes that it is right to apply the adjective ‘ready’ to all and only objects 
that are ready. In order for semantics to capture the normative aspect 
of meaning, clause (A) must exert its normative control over competent 
English speakers. Moreover, it must also be possible to explain how 
the adjective ‘ready’ arrived at the semantic property of applying to all 
and only objects that are ready. Of course, it is not a task for (descrip-
tive) semantics to answer such question, but a semantic theory must be 
compatible with an explanation of this sort. Thereby, if we gather evi-
dence that a semantic theory precludes such an explanation, we have 
evidence that that semantic theory is fl awed.
If the premises of incompleteness arguments are true, then it is a 
fact that people are unable to evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is ready’ as 
true or false independently of contextual information. If this is a fact, 
then people’s linguistic practice cannot be under the normative control 
of clause (A). The reason why people’s linguistic practice cannot be so 
governed is that clause (A) establishes conditions for the application of 
the adjective ‘ready’ such that competent speakers are never able to tell 
whether they are satisfi ed or not by any object o. This is just witnessed 
by people’s inability to evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is ready’ as true 
or false independently of contextual information.
The premises of incompleteness arguments, taken at face value, 
show that the semantic rule expressed by clause (A) is not applicable 
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because nobody within the linguistic community is able to tell when the 
conditions for the application of ‘ready’, as they are captured by clause 
(A), are satisfi ed and when they are not. Since rules must be applicable, 
the conclusion follows that clause (A) does not express any rule, and 
therefore cannot be a semantic clause, as it cannot play the normative 
role that is constitutive of semantic rules. Clause (A) does not account 
for the normative aspect of meaning.
Analogous considerations show that learning of the meaning of the 
adjective ‘ready’ cannot amount to learning of the meaning of a word 
governed by the semantic rule expressed in (A). Presumably we learn 
the meaning of words such as ‘ready’ by being exposed to utterances of 
simple sentences like ‘Mary is ready’. If the premises of incompleteness 
arguments are taken at face value, they show that competent English 
speakers are never able to track the truth-value of ‘Mary is ready’ inde-
pendently of contextual information. If this is true, the premises of in-
completeness arguments show that assertions of simple sentences like 
‘Mary is ready’ cannot be expressions of the belief that Mary is ready, 
i.e. the belief that the conditions for the application of ‘ready’, as they 
are captured by clause (A), are satisfi ed by Mary. If assertions of a sim-
ple sentence like ‘Mary is ready’ are not expressions of the belief that 
Mary satisfi es the application conditions of ‘ready’, whatever we learn 
from being exposed to assertions of that sort cannot be the meaning of 
a word that is governed by the semantic rule expressed by clause (A).
It is important to stress that this argument against Cappelen and 
Lepore has nothing to do with verifi cationism. The point is not that 
competent speakers are unable to evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is 
ready’ as true or false because of their epistemic and cognitive limita-
tions. Even if speakers knew everything about Mary, they would not be 
able to tell whether it is true or false that Mary is ready, unless some-
one specifi es what Mary is said to be ready for. The satisfaction of the 
application conditions for ‘ready’, as they are captured by clause (A), is 
something that is impossible for competent speakers to track. It is like 
a game whose rules are such that no referee is able to tell whether they 
are respected or violated by the moves of the players. Clearly such rules 
could not exert any normative control over the players of the game.
Moreover, in setting up the argument against Cappelen and Lepore 
one does not need to deny that semantic properties are objective in the 
sense that they are independent of explicit knowledge and discriminat-
ing abilities that competent speakers possess individually or as whole 
linguistic community. Externalist theories of reference hold that se-
mantic properties are unaffected by explicit and discriminating abili-
ties since they are determined by objective, causal connections to the 
world. However, externalists do have an account of how words are be-
stowed with their semantic properties, which basically rests on baptis-
mal events and, above all, multiple groundings. Baptismal events and 
multiple groundings require dispositions to keep tracks of individuals, 
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objects, substances, properties and relations in favourable environ-
mental circumstances. Words have the referents they have because, de 
facto and with the collaboration of the environment, most referential 
practices are related to those referents. For example, part of the expla-
nation of the fact that the name ‘Mary’ refers to Mary is that there are 
(were) people with the disposition to keep track of Mary and the en-
vironmental circumstances are (were) favourable (say, Mary does not 
change the way she looks from one day to the other, or there are not one 
thousand people looking like her in the same community and people 
who ground the name ‘Mary’ onto Mary interact constantly with her). 
Part of the explanation of the fact that the word ‘water’ refers to wa-
ter (the substance whose chemical structure is H2O), is that there are 
(were) people with the disposition to keep track of samples of water and 
the environmental circumstances are (were) favourable. Part of the ex-
planation of the fact that ‘blond’ refers to the property of being blond, 
is that there are (were) people with the dispositions to keep track of 
exemplifi cations of the property of being blond and the environmental 
circumstance are (were) favourable. This implies that there are (were) 
favourable environmental circumstances in which competent speakers 
are (were) able to point at Mary and say truly ‘She is Mary’, or to point 
at a sample of water and say truly ‘That is water’, or to point at a blond 
person and say truly ‘He/She is blond’. This in turn implies that there 
are (were) favourable environmental circumstances in which compe-
tent speakers are (were) able to truth evaluate sentences like ‘That is 
Mary’, ‘That is water’, ‘She is blond’, ‘Mary is blond’.
Externalist theories of reference keep semantics distinct from theo-
ries of linguistic competence. Semantic describes properties of linguis-
tic symbols, theories of linguistic competence describe the abilities of 
competent speakers to produce and use linguistic symbols. Linguistic 
competence with referential and inferential abilities is not constitutive 
of semantic properties. Linguistic symbols are the products of linguistic 
competence, its outputs (see Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 169). Of course, 
there is a causal relation between linguistic competence and linguistic 
symbols. But, as Devitt and Sterelny (1999: 172) point out, there is also 
a logical relation between linguistic competence and its products: pro-
ducing linguistic symbols with their semantic properties is what makes 
it the competence it is. In order for linguistic competence to produce 
linguistic symbols governed by semantic rules, the conditions for the 
application of semantically simple words fi xed by those semantic rules 
must be something of which competent speakers are able to keep track 
in favourable environmental circumstances.
The problem is that if the premises of incompleteness arguments 
are accepted a true, speakers do not possess the ability to track exem-
plifi cations of the property of being ready (simpliciter) and do not pos-
sess the ability truth evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is ready’. Thereby, 
the externalist account of reference does not work for expressions like 
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‘ready’. And if one loses the account of how the adjective ‘ready’ got 
assigned the property of being ready as its semantic content because 
speakers are unable to track exemplifi cations of the property of being 
ready, one loses an account of how clause (A) can exert any normative 
force over linguistic practices of competent speakers.
Cappelen and Lepore are right that the premises of incompleteness 
arguments do not entail that certain properties like being ready (sim-
pliciter), or being tall (simpliciter), or being strong (simpliciter), or hav-
ing enough (simpliciter) etc. do not exist. But this is beside the point. 
The premises of incompleteness arguments show that speakers are 
never able to track exemplifi cations of those properties. It follows that 
minimalist semantic clauses like (A) express semantic rules such that 
nobody is ever able to tell when they are respected and when they are 
violated. Such minimalist semantic rules are inapplicable and inappli-
cable semantic rules cannot exert any normative control over linguistic 
practice. Semantic minimalism faces a problem with the normative as-
pect of meaning: if linguistic practice is not under the normative con-
trol of semantic rules, there cannot be such things as going right and 
going wrong with the use of language. 
In Pursuing Meaning Borg adopts a different strategy against in-
completeness arguments. Borg rejects their premises and explains 
away the intuitions of incompleteness. Borg (2012: 92–102) agrees that 
speakers have an intuition of incompleteness with respect to sentences 
like ‘Mary is ready’, but she argues that intuitions of incompleteness 
emerge from some overlooked covert and context-insensitive syntactic 
structure. Borg says that ‘ready’ is lexically marked as an expression 
with two argument places. On Borg’s view ‘ready’ always denotes the 
same relation, the relation of readiness, which holds between a sub-
ject and the thing for which they are held to be ready. When only one 
argument place is fi lled at the surface level, the other is marked by 
an existentially bound variable in the logical form. The argument role 
corresponding to the direct object is existentially quantifi ed instead of 
being assigned a particular value. The suppression of the direct object 
arguably changes the semantic content of the adjective: it denotes not 
the original two-place relation, but a property generated by existential-
ly quantifying the object argument-role. Thereby ‘ready’ makes exactly 
the same contribution in any context of utterance to any proposition 
literally expressed. For example, Borg says that in a context where 
what is salient is the property being ready to join the fi re service the 
sentence ‘Mary is ready’ literally expresses the minimal proposition 
that Mary is ready for something not that Mary is ready to join the 
fi re service, and in a context where the property of being ready to take 
an exam in logic is salient ‘Mary is ready’ still literally expresses that 
Mary is ready for something. As Borg (2012: 104) points out, the mini-
mal proposition that Mary is ready for something is almost trivially 
true, because it is true in any possible world where Mary exists. Yet, 
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Borg warns us not to confl ate intuitions about the informativeness of a 
proposition with intuitions about its semantic completeness.
Borg’s explanation of the intuitions of incompleteness is that speak-
ers are aware of the need for the two arguments, which is in tension 
with the phonetic delivery of only one argument. Speakers are uneasy 
to truth-evaluate sentences like ‘Mary is ready’ not because the sen-
tence is semantically incomplete and lacks determinate truth condi-
tions, but because their expectation for the second argument to be 
expressed is frustrated and the minimal content that is semantically 
expressed, when the argument role corresponding to the direct object 
is not fi lled at the surface level, is barely informative. Borg’s response 
to incompleteness arguments avoids the problem that affects Cappelen 
and Lepore’s version of minimalism. On Borg’s view, speakers are able 
to truth evaluate the minimal content of ‘Mary is ready’, since that 
content is the minimal proposition that Mary is ready for something. 
If ‘ready’ in sentences like ‘Mary is ready’ literally means ready for 
something, competent speakers are obviously disposed to track the ap-
plication conditions for ‘ready’.
In a signifi cant respect Borg’s solution goes in the same direction 
as the traditional approach in semantics. As said, on a traditional se-
mantic theory the meaning of context sensitive expressions sets up the 
parameters that must be loaded with contextual values. Sometimes 
the parameters are explicitly expressed in the syntax of the sentence 
as with indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers of verbs. Sometimes, 
instead, the parameters do not fi gure at the level of surface syntax. 
Philosophers and linguists disagree on where the parameters that do 
not show up at the level of surface syntax are hidden. Some (Stanley 
2005a) hold that such parameters are associated with syntactic ele-
ments that occur in the logical form. Taylor (2003) advances a different 
theory. Taylor argues that hidden parameters are represented in the 
syntactic basement of the lexicon. They are not constituents of sen-
tences but subconstituents of words or phrases. On Taylor’s view, the 
lexical representations of words and phrases specify the parameters 
that must be loaded with contextual values in order for utterances of 
sentences to have determinate truth conditions. Taylor’s proposal is a 
way of implementing the view that context sensitive expressions are 
governed by conventions of saturation and that context sensitivity is 
always morpho-lexico-syntactically driven. Taylor’s view amounts to a 
denial of the phenomenon of meaning underdetermination and seman-
tic incompleteness and it is a way of treating context sensitivity within 
the camp of traditional semantics. Thus, when Borg says that ‘ready’ is 
lexically marked as an expression with two argument places, she says 
something that might go in the very same direction as Taylor’s. If Tay-
lor’s proposal is a way of implementing the traditional view in seman-
tics, so it seems to be Borg’s view. Yet, Borg is unwilling to accept this 
conclusion. Borg refuses to treat ‘ready’ and all the expressions that 
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are typically involved in incompleteness arguments as context sensi-
tive expressions.
We will argue that Borg’s conception of semantics faces a problem 
and the utterance-oriented conception of semantics on the tradition-
al approach seems to fare much better with respect to that problem. 
Borg’s version of minimalism maintains that the semantic content of 
a sentence S is typically different from the contents of speech acts per-
formed by utterances of S. Clapp (2007) raises the following natural-
istic challenge to minimalism. If it is a fact that an expression has a 
certain meaning, this fact must be grounded in facts concerning the lin-
guistic abilities and practices of competent speakers. The diffi culty for 
minimalism is to provide an account of what grounds the fact that an 
expression has the meaning it has, since minimalism keeps semantic 
contents apart from speech acts contents. Facts regarding speech acts 
contents have no bearing on facts regarding semantic contents (Cap-
pelen and Lepore 2005: 211). On the other hand, utterance-oriented se-
mantics has the advantage of relying on regularities of uses in linguistic 
practices. As Devitt (2007: 52) says, meanings are not ‘God given’, but 
as conventions need to be established and sustained by regular uses. 
On Devitt’s view, linguistic rules reveal themselves in the regular uses 
of certain forms for expressing certain contents. In order to individuate 
conventions, theoreticians can rely on an inference to the best explana-
tion: they must consider whether the regular use of an expression for 
performing certain speech acts is best explained by positing a linguistic 
rule for using that expression. Coming back to the example with the ad-
jective ‘ready’, Borg owes an explanation of what make it the case that 
‘ready’ literally means ‘ready for something’ when its second argument 
place is not lexicalized at the surface level. As Clapp points out, Borg’s 
view that our linguistic knowledge is encapsulated in a dedicated mod-
ule that represents the biconditional that the sentence ‘Mary is ready’ 
is true if and only if Mary is ready for something offers no answer. The 
problem is simply relocated. The problem now is to explain in virtue of 
what the language module works the way Borg takes it to work.
One might think that there are other theoretical reasons for favour-
ing Borg’s conception of semantics. In the next section we will discuss 
a recent attempt that Borg made to support the claim that minimal 
contents play an important theoretical role that contents of other kinds 
cannot play. We will argue that Borg’s argument is inconclusive. In the 
remainder of this section we will comment on two earlier arguments 
that Borg provides for proving her version of minimalism superior to 
Cappelen and Lepore’s one and to Bach’s radical minimalism.
Borg (2007: 351) argues that her account provides a more credible 
version of minimalism than Cappelen and Lepore’s version. According 
to Cappelen and Lepore, the sentence ‘Mary is ready’ expresses the 
minimal proposition that Mary is ready (simplicter). If this is so, then 
the sentence ‘Mary is not ready’ expresses the proposition that Mary 
 C. Penco and M. Vignolo, Some Refl ections on Conventions 391
is not ready (simpliciter). Borg argues that Cappelen and Lepore pro-
posal is unable to explain situations in which both sentences are true 
together, for instance if Mary is ready to go to the party but not ready 
to take the logic exam. Borg proposal accommodates this case giving 
narrow scope to the negation: ‘Mary is ready and Mary is not ready’ 
is true if and only if there is something for which Mary is ready and 
there is something for which Mary is not ready. We will not address 
the question whether Borg’s argument is a good one against Cappelen 
and Lepore. We point out that it does not raise any diffi culty for a tradi-
tional utterance-oriented semantics according to which there might be 
true utterances of ‘Mary is ready and Mary is not ready.’ Suppose John 
is talking to Jeff and Mark. Jeff wants to know whether Mary is ready 
to go to the party and Mark wants to know whether Mary is ready to 
take the logic exam. John can say ‘Well, Jeff, Mary is ready but, Mark, 
she is not ready’ and tell the truth. John can say that having in mind 
going to the party for the saturation of the fi rst occurrence of ‘ready’ 
and taking the logic exam for the saturation of the second occurrence.
Borg (2012: 209) makes an attempt to promote her view against 
Bach’s radical version of minimalism. Borg says that the view that the 
sentence ‘Mary is ready’ literally expresses the minimal content that 
Mary is ready for something copes with the Cancellability Test. She 
rightly says that readings that make it explicit the presence of an exis-
tentially bound variable cannot be cancelled without contradiction. It 
is not possible to say without contradiction ‘Mary is ready, though I do 
not mean ready for something’. Borg’s conclusion is that a reading that 
cannot be cancelled without contradiction seems to have the right to 
be the literal content of a sentence. Borg rhetorically wonders why one 
cannot cancel the existentially bound content and assert the gappy con-
tent (the propositional radical) that Bach takes to be the literal content 
of ‘Mary is ready.’ In the same vein, Borg says that it is always possible 
to retract a contextually enriched content. Even in a context in which 
it is readiness to go to the party that is salient, one can say ‘Mary is 
ready, but I mean to take the logic exam, not to go to the party.’
We want to stress two points in reply to Borg. First, it is true that 
in Borg’s example the speaker retracts the content that Mary is ready 
to go to the party. But the speaker does so by loading another value 
for the parameter of ‘ready.’ This is in line with the metaphysical role 
that the speaker plays in the determination of what is said. What is 
said is not determined by what is salient in the context of utterance, 
or by what the hearer understands, or by what the hearer is expected 
to understand. It might be very likely that in a context in which going 
to the party is salient, if the speaker says ‘Mary is ready,’ the hearer 
will understand that Mary is ready to go to the party. But this is not 
determinative of what the speaker semantically expresses. Moreover, 
it does not follow that Mary is ready for something is the literal mean-
ing of ‘Mary is ready’ from the premise that such content is not cancel-
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lable. On the traditional approach, that Mary is ready for something 
is a logical consequence of the semantic contents of utterances of the 
sentence ‘Mary is ready.’ Clearly, if the semantic content of an utter-
ance of ‘Mary is ready’ is that Mary is ready to take the logic exam, that 
semantic content entails that Mary is ready for something, which can-
not be cancelled without contradiction. It does not follow that ‘ready’ 
is not a context sensitive expression and that ‘Mary is ready’ literally 
expresses the minimal content that Mary is ready for something.
Second, it is worth noticing that the speaker cannot retract the con-
tent that Mary is ready to go to the party by saying ‘Mary is ready, but 
I mean for something, not to go to the party.’ That move would be an 
open violation of the maxims of the cooperative principle. Indeed, the 
speaker would make it manifest that she is literally saying something 
that is almost trivially true, and thereby not informative or relevant. 
The speaker cannot retract the content that Mary is ready to go to the 
party by retreating to Borg’s minimal content that Mary is ready for 
something without making it explicit that she is not cooperative. We 
will come back to this point in the next section.
We have one last comment on minimal contents. Minimalists argue 
that minimal propositions serve as fall back contents when contextual 
information helpful for hearers to fi gure out the speakers’ intentional 
states is inaccessible or insuffi cient or unreliable. Borg holds that lin-
guistic knowledge is encapsulated in a language module and insulated 
from non-linguistic information. The linguistic knowledge so encap-
sulated and insulated guarantees that any competent speaker is able 
to recover a truth conditional content merely through exposure to the 
sentence uttered. Yet, semantics on the traditional approach does not 
need to deny the existence of a layer of truth conditions that are recov-
erable only on the basis of strict linguistic knowledge. Semantics in the 
narrow sense is the study of the meanings of simple expressions and 
their modes of combination. These semantic properties of expressions 
determine the conditions that must obtain in order for an utterance 
of a sentence to express a truth. This is the layer of truth conditional 
content that some philosophers (Perry 2001, Korta and Perry 2011) 
capture with the notion of token-refl exive content, or utterance-bound 
content and in model-theoretic or other formal approaches to languag-
es (Kaplan 1989) is represented with semantic compositional clauses 
that quantify over indexes that represent contextual factors. A compe-
tent speaker can know what conditions must obtain for an utterance of 
a sentence or a sentence at an index to express a truth without having 
any clue about the speaker’s intentional states that determine the val-
ues of saturation and, therefore, without grasping the semantic content 
of the utterance (Korta and Perry’s locutionary content). Any other ad-
ditional layer of truth conditions such as minimal propositions seems 
to be an arbitrary posit that becomes an idle wheel.9
9 Korta and Perry (2006, 2008) discuss several examples to show that in 
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3. Fixing conventions
In this section we will address a methodological diffi culty in Devitt’s 
view and propose a solution to it. As said, Devitt’s strategy for defend-
ing the traditional approach to semantic is to expand the range of poly-
semy and indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed 
context sensitivity) by increasing the number of conventions in lan-
guage. Devitt’s view raises the immediate diffi culty of telling what is 
the evidence for tracking conventions in language. Devitt rejects the 
recourse to intuitions on truth conditions, judgements on reports on 
what is said, judgments on contents consciously accessible during on-
line processing of sentences, and judgments on input for rational recon-
struction of conversational implicatures. Notoriously, such judgments 
by laypersons are inconsistent and unreliable because they tend to con-
fl ate contents that are semantically expressed with contents that are 
pragmatically conveyed. On the other hand, the experts’ judgments run 
the risk of being biased by the theories they embrace. 
Devitt suggests looking for evidence in the regular and systematic 
usage of expressions. If speakers regularly and systematically use cer-
tain expressions to express certain contents, then theoreticians must 
consider whether such regularities are best explained by supposing 
that there are linguistic rules of using those expressions that way. The-
oreticians are justifi ed to posit conventional rules if by doing so they 
obtain the best explanation of speakers’ linguistic behaviour.
We believe that Devitt’s methodological picture is basically correct 
but it is too sketchy as it stands and runs the risk of over-generation. 
Let us consider the following example with ‘to cut’. It seems uncon-
troversial that in many typical contexts, the verb ‘to cut’ conveys the 
information that the act of cutting is performed in a canonical way 
depending on the situation:
Hairdresser context: John cut Marie’s hair [with hairdressing scissors]
Cook context: John cut the meat [with a knife].
Fireman context: John cut the car door [with rescue shears].
Woodsman context: John cut the tree [with an axe].
Tailor context: John cut the silk [with tailor’s scissors].
Gardener context: John cut the grass [with a lawnmower].
It seems a regularity of use that in specifi c contexts the verb ‘to cut’ 
conveys the information that the act of cutting is performed with a 
specifi c tool. Is this information encoded in the meaning of the verb 
‘to cut’? If this is so, is it encoded in virtue of polysemy or in virtue 
of a convention of saturation? And if it is a convention of saturation 
that demands the speaker undertake the semantic burden of having 
in mind a tool or a way of cutting, how can we tell whether there are 
many cases hearers do not need to grasp what speakers semantically say in order 
to understand what speakers intend to convey. It is enough that they gasp the 
utterance-bound content.
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other parameters that require saturation, for example about the rapid-
ity or the precision and straightness of the cut, or the location where 
the action of cutting takes place? Devitt sketchy suggestion that if the 
examination of linguistic usage shows that an expression is regularly 
used to express certain contents then we have good evidence that such 
use is conventional is not much help to work out the answers. What 
kind of data can theoreticians rely on in order to make progress in their 
semantic theories?
Some philosophers (see Borg 2012: 206) and linguists propose to 
look for evidence at the syntactic level. Recanati (2004: 102) discusses 
and rejects the Binding Criterion:
A contextual ingredient in the interpretation of a sentence S results 
from saturation if it can be ‘bound’, that is, if it can be made to vary 
with the values introduced by some operator prefi xed to S.
The problem with the Binding Criterion is that it over-generates. As 
Cappelen and Lepore (2002), Breheny (2004), and Recanati (2004) point 
out, if the Binding Criterion is employed as a test for detecting param-
eters that demand saturation, it yields an unacceptable proliferation of 
parameters. In point of fact, in order to defend the Binding Argument 
from the charge of over-generation, Stanley (2005b: 235) urges not to 
interpret it as a criterion for detecting hidden parameters. Stanley says 
that the Binding Argument must be taken as an inference to the best 
explanation of bound interpretations: by postulating covert variables 
one can explain bound interpretations. On Stanley’s view, evidence for 
bound interpretations comes from speakers’ intuitions on truth condi-
tions. From Stanley’s perspective, then, the Binding Argument does 
not provide evidence for detecting hidden parameters. Rather, it pre-
supposes evidence for bound interpretations from speakers’ intuitions 
on truth conditions.
Furthermore, Recanati (2004: 110) proposes an alternative expla-
nation of bound interpretations that avoids the presence of covert vari-
able in the logical form of expressions. Recanti rejects the argument 
from premises 1 and 2 to conclusion 3:
1. In the sentence ‘whenever Bob lights a cigarette, it rains’, the refer-
ence to the location varies according to the value of the variable bound 
by the quantifi er ‘whenever Bob lights a cigarette’.
2. There can be no binding without a variable in the logical form.
3. In the logical form of ‘it rains’ there is a variable for locations, al-
though phonologically not realized.
Recanati argues that this argument is fallacious because of an ambigu-
ity in conclusion 3, where the sentence ‘it rains’ can be intended either 
in isolation or as a part of compound phrases. According to Recanati, 
the sentence ‘it rains’ contains a covert variable when it occurs as a 
part of the compound sentence ‘whenever Bob lights a cigarette, it 
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rains’, but it does not contain any variable when it occurs as an atomic 
sentence.
Recanati explanation of bound interpretations exploits expressions 
that modify predicates. Given an n-place predicate, a modifi er can form 
an n+1 place or an n–1 place predicate. Expressions like ‘here’ or ‘in 
London’ are special modifi ers that transform the predicate ‘it rains’ 
from a one-place predicate to a two-place predicate but provide also a 
value for the new argument place. Recanati argues that expressions 
like ‘whenever Bob lights a cigarette’ are modifi ers like ‘here’ and ‘in 
London’. They change the number of predicate places and provide a 
value to the new argument through the value of the variable they bind. 
Recanati’s conclusion is that although binding requires variables in the 
logical form of compound sentences, there is no need to insert covert 
variables in sub-sentential expressions or sentences in isolation.
Thus, to appeal to the Binding Criterion amounts to putting the 
syntactic cart before the semantic horse with the risk of over-genera-
tion and fallacy and the appeal to the Binding Argument presupposes 
a methodology that relies on speakers’ intuitions on truth conditions, 
which Devitt explicitly rejects. If evidence is not to be found at the syn-
tactic level, it must be found elsewhere.
In the previous section, we saw that Devitt puts much weight on the 
normative aspect of meaning in order to mount an argument against 
linguistic pragmatism. One might try to analyse the semantic burdens 
that speakers undertake in utterances of sentences to collect evidence 
for the structure of semantic contents. This is to say that one might 
collect evidence by the study of the moves that speakers are allowed or 
obliged to do for defending or retracting their utterances. Elaborating 
on Grice (1989), Michaelson (2016: 477) takes into consideration the 
Cancellability Test:
If q is part of the semantic content expressed by a sentence S at a con-
text C, then:
A. One should not be able to consistently utter ‘S, but not Q’ at C, where
B. ‘not Q’ is a standard way of denying q.
However, with respect to Devitt’s attempt to defend the traditional ap-
proach to semantics by expanding the range of polysemy, the Cancel-
lability Test has a severe limitation. Consider the sentence ‘John and 
Mary got married and had a child’. Devitt explains the interpretation 
that John and Mary got married before having a child by polysemy: 
‘and’ is a polysemous word having multiple meanings, one for the truth-
functional conjunction and one for the temporally/causally ordered con-
junction. Of course, the temporal ordering can be cancelled. One might 
say ‘John and Mary got married and had a child, but not in that order’. 
Yet, as Michaelson acknowledges, to argue that Devitt’s theory is mis-
taken because it fails the Cancellability Test would be to beg the ques-
tion against Devitt. It is open to Devitt to claim that the phrase ‘but 
not in that order’ does not cancel a pragmatic enrichment but makes 
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it explicit a disambiguation. The Cancellabiltiy Test does not supply 
relevant data for deciding whether certain forms of context sensitivity 
can be explained by polysemy and it has a very limited application for 
Devitt’s purpose of collecting data from the usage of sentences.
The Cancellability Test is based upon the idea that the semantic 
content of an utterance is something to which the speaker is commit-
ted on pain of contradiction or semantic incompetence. Elaborating on 
this idea, some philosophers like Saul (2012), Michaelson (2016), Borg 
(2017) have proposed to make use of judgements of lying for tracking 
semantic contents. The central assumption is that if a speaker utters 
a sentence S and is not lying, then p is not the semantic content of S 
provided that the speaker believes the content p to be false and intends 
to deceive her audience about p. Michaelson (2016: 482) offers the fol-
lowing formulation of the Lying Test:
If p is part of the semantic content associated with a sentence P, 
as uttered by X to Y, then either:
A. P is a lie, or
B. it is not the case that X believes that p is false, or 
C. it is not the case that X intends to deceive Y with respect to p.
Michaelson and Borg10 employ the Lying Test to argue against the idea 
that the conjunction ‘and’ is polysemous. Consider the following ex-
ample in Borg (2017):11
A rich catholic fundamentalist decides to leave her entire fortune to 
Jack, as long as Jack has lived his life in full compliance with the pre-
cepts of Catholicism. The rich fundamentalist asks John for informa-
tion about Jack’s life. John intends to favour his friend Jack wishing 
him to inherit the huge amount of money and, knowing that Jack had 
two children before getting married, he says:
Jack got married and had two children.
John intends his speech act to make the rich fundamentalist believe 
that Jack got married and then had two children. John’s utterance is 
misleading and clearly intended to be so. Moreover, John knows that it 
is false that Jack got married before having two children.
By the application of the Lying Test, Michaelson argues that since 
John is not lying, believes the temporally ordered content to be false, 
and intends to deceive the rich fundamentalist about that content, the 
temporally ordered content is not the semantic content of John’s utter-
ance. On Michaelson’s view, the Lying Test provides evidence in favour 
of the unifi ed account of the meaning of ‘and’ and against the polyse-
mous account.
10 More precisely, Borg argues against linguistic pragmatism and in defence of 
minimalism.
11 Borg’s example is a variation of an example in Saul (2012: 37).
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We agree that the Lying Test is somehow on the right track for col-
lecting evidence in semantics but disagree on Michaelson’s on his con-
clusion against the polysemous account of the meaning of ‘and’ (and we 
disagree with Borg on her use of the Liying Test for defending minimal-
ism). Michaelson says that the polysemous account predicts that John 
semantically expressed the temporally ordered content that Jack got 
married before having two children because it is the speaker’s preroga-
tive to choose how polysemous expressions should be disambiguate, 
and John intends for his use to be disambiguated temporally. We argue 
that Michaelson’s argument fails because it confl ates the metaphysics 
of meaning with the epistemology of understanding. Certainly, it is the 
speaker’s prerogative to choose how an expression has to be disambigu-
ated. In the above scenario, if someone charged John of lying, nothing 
could prevent John from defending himself and claiming that he said 
that Jack got married and had two children in one order or the other. 
John’s self defence could not be impeached by observing that that is not 
how the rich fundamentalist interpreted John’s utterance or that John 
knew that that was not how the rich fundamentalist would interpret 
his utterance. What the hearer does or what the hearer is expected to 
do is not determinative of semantic content. To say that it is the speak-
er’s prerogative to choose how an expression should be disambiguated 
is to say that the speaker undertakes the semantic burden of choosing 
a certain meaning. To the extent that in the depicted scenario John is 
allowed to choose the truth functional meaning for ‘and’ and to defend 
his choice explicitly and in public, there is no reason to force upon his 
utterance the temporally ordered content, even if John knew that the 
rich fundamentalist would interpret his utterance that way.
Of course, John’s communicative strategy is very tricky, but what 
makes it tricky is just the fact that in the above scenario John can play 
with the polysemy of ‘and’. Indeed, if we change the scenario and imag-
ine a situation in which John cannot play with the polysemy of ‘and’, 
we get evidence in favour of the polysemous account. Suppose that the 
rich fundamentalist asks John the following direct question and John 
gives the following answer:
Fundamentalist: Did Jack get married and have two children or did he 
have two children and get married?
John: Jack got married and had two children
In this case, the intuition that John is lying and not merely misleading 
his interlocutor is stronger than the intuition that John is not lying. No-
body would accept as legitimate John’s defence that he was not saying 
that Jack got married and then had two children. Contrary to the pre-
vious scenario, given the formulation of the question asked by the rich 
fundamentalist, in which it is clear that the conjunction ‘and’ is used 
with the temporally ordered content, John cannot respond that he was 
not saying that Jack got married and then had two children, on pain of 
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making it open that he did not understand the question, and thereby on 
pain of showing himself linguistically incompetent or non-cooperative.
The view that treats the conjunction ‘and’ as polysemous offers a 
straightforward explanation of what happens in the second scenario. 
The rich fundamentalist uses ‘and’ with the temporally ordered mean-
ing. Therefore, the retreat to the truth functional meaning would be an 
unacceptable admission of linguistic incompetence on behalf of John. 
In this case John cannot play with the polysemy of ‘and’, given the way 
in which the rich fundamentalist asks the question. It is not obvious 
that the unifi ed account of the meaning of ‘and’ can cope with this case, 
as it lacks an explanation of the strong intuition that John is lying and 
not merely misleading his interlocutor.
One interesting aspect of the Lying Test is that it works with a no-
tion of semantic content that is characterised in terms of the semantic 
burdens that speakers undertake in utterances of sentences. It con-
nects semantic contents to utterances in virtue of the linguistic liability 
that speakers are held to have for the contents of the speech acts they 
perform. These semantic burdens can be investigated by studying the 
moves that speakers are allowed or obliged to make when their utter-
ances are challenged, on pain of linguistic incompetence, irrationality 
or non-cooperativeness. The analysis of such moves is helpful to work 
out a solution to the slippery slope argument that threatens the theo-
ries that aim to treat context sensitivity as a semantic phenomenon. 
The slippery slope argument leads to the conclusion that if one starts 
treating some expressions as context sensitive on the basis of context 
shifting arguments and incompleteness arguments, one loses a prin-
cipled way to distinguish context sensitive expressions from context 
invariant ones and a principled way to select for any context sensitive 
expression the parameters that demand saturation, because for any 
expression and after any process of saturation one can always raise 
further questions about more contextual precisifi cations. 
Our answer to the slippery slope argument is that what matters is 
not the openness to further questions for more precisifi cations, but the 
kind of legitimate answers that speakers are allowed to give. We pro-
pose to use more vigorously the No-Idea Test that Recanati discusses in 
(2010: 84).12 The basic insight underlying the No-Idea Test is that if an 
expression demands the saturation of a certain parameter, the speaker 
is not allowed to reply with ‘I have no idea’ to a request of precisifi ca-
tion. For example, the No-Idea Test provides evidence that the verb ‘to 
arrive’ requires saturation for the location of the arrival, as the infelic-
ity of the following dialogue shows:
A. John has arrived.
B. Where has he arrived?
A. I have no idea.#
12 Recanati (2010: 84) says that the No-Idea Test was originally proposed by 
Jarmila Panevova.
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The reason why the speaker is not allowed to reply with ‘I have no idea’ 
is that the speaker cannot avoid undertaking the semantic burden of 
specifying the location where John arrived on pain of committing her 
speech act to the content that John arrived in some place or other. This 
content is in open violation of the maxims of conversation, because it is 
not relevant and very likely the speaker has no justifi cation for making 
an assertion with that content. The speaker cannot commit herself to 
that content, on pain of proving herself non-cooperative.
Likewise, one is not allowed to reply with ‘I have no idea’ to a re-
quest of precisifi cation for those expressions like ‘ready’, ‘tall’, quan-
tifi ed nouns phrases, that linguistic pragmatists typically employ to 
construct counterexamples to semantic theories on the traditional ap-
proach. The following dialogues are all infelicitous:
A. John is ready. A. John is tall. A. There are no beers.
B. What is he ready for? B. What is he tall for? B. Where?
A. I have no idea.# A. I have no idea.# A. I have no idea.#
On the contrary, the No-Idea Test shows that the way in which the ac-
tion of cutting is performed is not part of the semantic content of the 
verb ‘to cut’. The following dialogue looks fi ne:
A. John cut the cake.
B. How did he manage to cut the cake? There were no cooking utensils 
in the kitchen!
A. I have no idea.
This is evidence that the verb ‘to cut’ does not demand saturation for 
the way of cutting. As Devitt points out, ‘to cut’ might have a context 
invariant content along the lines of to produce linear separation in 
the material integrity of something by a sharp edge coming in contact 
with it. The information about the way in which the action of cutting is 
performed is pragmatically conveyed, not semantically encoded in the 
meaning of ‘to cut’.
The No-Idea Test provides evidence that ‘ready’, ‘tall’, quantifi ed 
noun phrases pattern with ‘to arrive’. Their meaning demands that the 
speaker undertake the semantic burden of saturating certain param-
eters. Weather reports are other examples that linguistic pragmatists 
typically employ to argue against traditional semantic theories. We ac-
knowledge that weather reports are much more controversial cases. On 
the one hand, the following dialogue might seem infelicitous as much 
as the previous ones:
A. It is raining.
B. Where is it raining?
A. I have no idea.#
On the other hand, Recanati (2002: 317) has discussed the ‘weather-
man’ scenario for supporting the claim that ‘to rain’ does not demand 
saturation for locations: after weeks of total drought, one of the alarm 
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bells that are connected to rain detectors that have been placed all over 
the territory rings in the monitoring room. The weatherman on duty in 
the adjacent room says: ‘It is raining’. The following dialogue looks fi ne 
(Recanti 2010: 86):
A. (The weatherman) It is raining.
B. Where is it raining?
A. I have no idea. Let us check.
Recanati holds that the truth conditions of the utterance of the weath-
erman are that it is raining in some place or other. According to Re-
canati, the possibility of the indefi nite reading proves that the felt com-
pulsion to complete truth conditions of weather reports with locations, 
when such a compulsion is indeed felt, has a pragmatic nature. Recan-
ati (2010) gives a long argument against the possibility of explaining 
the indefi nite reading through a covert existential quantifi cation on the 
parameter for the location. 
As we said, this case is very controversial and we have no space to 
discuss it at length. We have just a couple of remarks. First, taking for 
granted that the weatherman is not able to make reference to the loca-
tion where it is raining (i.e. to entertain a singular proposition about 
that location), it does not follow that the weatherman does not have 
in mind that location by description, in such a way that the weather-
man is able to denote the location where it is raining (i.e. to entertain 
a general proposition about that location). Indeed, the weatherman 
can think of that location as the location where the rain detector that 
caused the alarm bell to ring has been placed. There is a reading ac-
cording to which the truth conditions of the weatherman’s utterance 
are that it is raining at the location where the rain detector that caused 
the alarm bell to ring has been placed. Thus, we put in doubt the claim 
that the weatherman’s example is a genuine case of indefi nite reading.
Second, Recanati’s argument against the possibility of explaining 
indefi nite readings through a covert quantifi cation rests on a doubtful 
and idiosyncratic intuition. Recanati argues that there are utterances 
of ‘It is not raining’ that cannot be given the indefi nite reading that 
somewhere it is not raining, which is the reading that is predicted by 
the theory that explains indefi nite readings through covert existential 
quantifi cation over the location parameter. Recanati (2010: 103) dis-
cusses a ‘reversed weatherman’ scenario: after a long period of heavy 
rain and fl oods all over the territory detectors for the absence of rain 
are placed. One day the alarm bell connected to a detector rings and the 
weatherman on duty says ‘It is not raining’.
Recanati’s comment is that he fi nds it rather hard to understand 
the utterance with the content that somewhere it is not raining (wide 
scope indefi nite reading). Recanati’s intuition is that the only avail-
able interpretation is that it is not raining anywhere (narrow scope 
indefi nite reading). According to Recanati, the weatherman ought to 
say ‘The rain has stopped’, which could be interpreted as meaning that 
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the rain has stopped somewhere. Thus, Recanati’s conclusion is that 
the theory that explains indefi nite readings of weather reports through 
a covert quantifi cation over the location parameter is unable to explain 
the unavailability of the wide scope indefi nite reading in the reversed 
weatherman scenario.
We acknowledge that weather reports are very controversial cases 
and leave the full discussion of them for another paper. We want to 
stress, however, that Recanati’s argument rests entirely on his intu-
ition that the wide scope indefi nite reading in the reversed weather-
man scenario is not available. We fi nd Recanati’s intuition no less con-
troversial than weather reports in general.
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